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Three experiments investigated the extent to which (a) individuals with autism show a self-reference
effect (i.e., better memory for self-relevant information), and (b) the size of the self-reference effect is
associated with autism traits. Participants studied trait adjectives in relation to their own name (self-
referent) or a celebrity’s name (other-referent) under explicit and incidental/implicit encoding conditions.
Explicit encoding involved judging whether the adjectives applied to self or other (denoted by proper
names). Implicit encoding involved judging whether the adjectives were presented to the right or left of
one’s own or a celebrity’s name. Recognition memory for the adjectives was tested using a yes/no
procedure. Experiment 1 (individual differences; N  257 neurotypical adults) employed the Autism-
spectrum Quotient as a measure of autistic traits. Experiments 2 (n  60) and 3 (n  52) involved
case-control designs with closely matched groups of autistic and neurotypical adults and children/
adolescents, respectively. Autistic traits were measured using the Autism-spectrum Quotient and Social
Responsiveness Scale, respectively. In all experiments, a significant self-reference effect was observed
in both explicit and implicit encoding conditions. Most importantly, however, there was (a) no significant
relation between size of the self-reference effect and number of autistic traits (Experiments 1, 2, and 3),
and (b) no significant difference in the size of the self-reference effect between autistic and neurotypical
participants (Experiments 2 and 3). In these respects, Bayesian analyses consistently suggested that the
data supported the null hypothesis. These results challenge the notion that subjective or objective
self-awareness are impaired in autism.
General Scientific Summary
It is generally easier to remember information that is relevant to oneself than to remember other kinds
of information. This is known as the “self-reference effect.” Previously, it has been claimed that
people with autism show a reduced self-reference effect (implying diminished self-awareness), but
this study provides robust evidence that people with autism are, in fact, just as susceptible to this
effect as neurotypical people.
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The study of self has a long history in psychology and philos-
ophy. One prominent distinction is made between different levels
of self-awareness. On the one hand, the self is the subject of
consciousness—an entity that experiences and acts on the world.
This “subjective” level was referred to by James (1890) as the “I”
and involves only a first-order representation of self. On the other
hand, the self can also be thought about; it can be the object of
thought/consciousness, as well as the subject. This “objective”
level was referred to by James (1890) as the “Me” and necessarily
involves a second-order representation of self. Crucially, it has
long been argued that memory and the self are inextricably linked,
and that self-representation influences cognition more generally in
specific ways (e.g., Conway, 2005; Hume, 1739/2003; James,
1890; Locke, 1690/1995; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013; Wilson
& Ross, 2003). One of the clearest empirical demonstrations of
this is the so-called “self-reference effect,” whereby information
encoded in relation to the self has a memory advantage over
information encoded in other ways (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker,
1977). There is extensive and robust evidence for this effect, and
it occurs across a range of memory tasks and encoding conditions
(Symons & Johnson, 1997).
In classic self-referential trait memory tasks (e.g., Kuiper,
1982), participants are presented with personality trait adjectives
(e.g., patient, tenacious, arrogant) usually under two encoding
conditions: self-referential and other-person-referential (typically a
well-known celebrity). In the self-referential condition, the trait
adjective must be processed in relation to the self: for example, by
asking, “Is [participant’s name] patient?” In the other-person-
referential condition, the adjective must be processed in relation to
another person: for example, by asking, “Is Teresa May tena-
cious?” Numerous studies have shown that recall and recognition
of trait labels judged in relation to self is superior to recall and
recognition of trait labels judged in relation to another person
(Symons & Johnson, 1997). This trait evaluation memory para-
digm is the most widely used measure of self-reference in the
literature and has been pivotal to the development of theories about
self-referential cognition for nearly 40 years (Conway & Dew-
hurst, 1995; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988;
Symons & Johnson, 1997). The effect is remarkably robust and
meta-analytic results suggest that self-reference is the most effi-
cient encoding mechanism for promoting memory (Symons &
Johnson, 1997). The traditional self-bias on the trait memory
paradigm is associated with activity in prefrontal cortex (particu-
larly the dorsal medial region; e.g., Sui & Humphreys, 2017; Turk,
Van Bussel, Waiter, & Macrae, 2011), a region of the brain
considered to underpin/contribute to conscious reflection on and
evaluation of oneself (Schmitz & Johnson, 2007).
The self-reference effect has traditionally been thought to result
from a high-level cognitive process that involves “deep” elabora-
tive encoding of information (Craik & Tulving, 1975): By becom-
ing objectively self-aware during the encoding phase on self-
referential trials, one’s explicit, second-order self-representation
(the “Me”) scaffolds encoding of the trait word and leads to better
recall/recognition during the memory test phase. However, more
recently the self-reference effect has been proposed to originate in
an implicit fashion (e.g., Sui & Humphreys, 2015; Cunningham,
Brebner, Quinn, & Turk, 2014), via a subjective, first-order rep-
resentation of self (the “I”). According to this view, low-level
self-awareness biases attention, perception, memory, and motor
planning in a relatively automatic manner, without requiring any
explicit thought about oneself. Turk, Cunningham, and Macrae
(2008; also see Cunningham et al., 2014) explored this by creating
an “incidental” encoding condition of the trait memory paradigm,
in which participants were asked to judge whether trait adjectives
appeared above or below their name or a celebrity’s name. Thus,
participants were required merely to make a spatial judgment that
involved only a superficial form of processing (iconic memory), as
opposed to deep semantic processing of/thought about self-related
information. Yet, during a subsequent recognition phase, partici-
pants showed a significant self-reference effect in this incidental
condition as well as during the classic evaluative processing con-
dition (although the size of the self-bias was significantly larger in
the explicit condition).
The research discussed thus far has major implications for our
understanding of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). ASD has long
been identified as involving an atypical awareness of self (e.g.,
Hobson, 1990; Frith, 2003; Lombardo & Baron-Cohen, 2010), and
several hypotheses concerning its relation to its behavioral pheno-
type have been proposed. For example, Hobson (2010) has argued
that individuals with ASD have a diminished capacity for “iden-
tifying” with the attitudes of others (a form of self-other related-
ness) and this results in diminished awareness of self and others
and, consequently, diminished communication and reciprocal so-
cial interaction (key diagnostic features). Frith (2003) has put
forward a similar, if more extreme argument, proposing that peo-
ple with autism have a “missing self” and, consequently, cannot
“communicate with other people’s self-aware selves” (p. 216). She
further proposes that the self is responsible for top-down control of
cognition and behavior (i.e., self-regulation) and suggests that,
ultimately, characteristic cognitive-level difficulties in theory of
mind, executive functions, and central coherence (the capacity for
global rather than local perceptual or cognitive processing) can be
explained by this putative absent self.
As well as potentially explaining a large portion of the overall
ASD phenotype, atypical self-awareness has been proposed as a
key contributor to the specific profile of strengths and difficulties
with memory experienced by individuals with this disorder (see
Lind, 2010; Lind, Williams, Grainger, & Landsiedel, 2018). Al-
though some have suggested that difficulties with self-awareness
in ASD are limited to objective, second-order self-representation
(the self as the object of experience—the “me”; e.g., Frith, 2012;
Williams, Nicholson, & Grainger, 2018), others have suggested
that subjective, first-order self-representation is also atypical in
this disorder (the self as the subject of experience—the “I”; e.g.,
Powell & Jordan, 1996; Millward, Powell, Messer, & Jordan,
2000).
The performance of individuals with autism on self-referential
memory tasks has been cited by many researchers as providing key
insight into self-awareness in this disorder (e.g., Lombardo &
Baron-Cohen, 2010). On the one hand, if the self-reference effect
is diminished, this may be taken as evidence for impaired self-
awareness. On the other hand, if people with ASD show a typical
or enhanced self-reference effect, this may be taken as indirect
evidence for intact or superior self-awareness in autism. Three
studies (Burrows, Usher, Mundy, & Henderson, 2017; Henderson
et al., 2009; Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen,
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2007)1 have explored self-referential memory among people with
ASD using the explicit trait memory paradigm. Across the studies,
the mean weighted effect size for the between-groups difference in
the size of the self-reference effect is Cohen’s d 0.65, suggesting
a moderate-to-large diminution of this effect in ASD.2 These
results have frequently been interpreted as evidence of an impair-
ment in objective self-awareness in this disorder. For example,
some of the authors of the current paper have previously argued
(Williams et al., 2018; Lind, 2010) that the self-reference effect is
diminished in ASD because the classic trait memory paradigm
requires explicit evaluative judgments about self (i.e., the self to be
thought about) during the encoding phase of the task. As such, a
diminished second-order self-representation among people with
ASD means that self-referential information is not processed more
deeply/preferentially than other-referential information, at this
level. However, Williams et al. predicted that the self-bias would
be undiminished among autistic people on an incidental encoding
version of the trait memory paradigm, because encoding of self-
relevant information required only subjective, first-order orienta-
tion to self-relevant information (the “I”), rather than explicit
reflection on and evaluation of oneself (the “me”; see Cunningham
et al., 2014, for the same argument about the underlying basis of
performance on the implicit and explicit trait memory paradigms).
We tested these hypotheses in three experiments using the
classic, explicit trait memory paradigm, as well as an implicit,
incidental version of the task employed by Turk et al. (2008). In
Experiment 1, we took an individual differences approach and
investigated whether the size of the self-bias in each condition
would be associated significantly with the number of self-reported
ASD traits among a large sample of neurotypical (NT) adults. It is
well established that number of ASD traits varies continuously in
the general population, with the overwhelming majority of NT
individuals manifesting at least some ASD traits and diagnosed
individuals falling toward the upper end of the distribution (e.g.,
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Constan-
tino & Todd, 2003). The term “broad autism phenotype” describes
individuals with elevated but subclinical levels of ASD traits
(Bailey et al., 1995). The continuously distributed nature of ASD
traits means that it is possible to explore the relation between these
traits and other variables among people without an ASD diagnosis.
This is the approach we took in Experiment 1. At the outset of the
study, we predicted that the number of self-reported ASD traits
would be significantly negatively associated with the size of the
self-bias on the traditional explicit paradigm (more ASD traits 
smaller self-bias), but not with the size of the self-bias on the
incidental implicit paradigm.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Two-hundred-and-fifty-seven psychology stu-
dents (198 female, 59 male) from the University of Kent or City,
University of London took part in Experiment 1. This sample size
allows detection of correlations of .17 on 80% of occasions if
they exist (GPower3; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).
The average age of participants was 20.58 (SD  5.37) years. No
participant had a history of ASD, according to self-report. All
participants also completed the autism-spectrum quotient (AQ), a
valid and reliable measure of ASD traits in people (of normal
intelligence) with a full diagnosis and in the general population
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001).
Participants read statements (e.g., “I find social situations easy”; “I
find myself drawn more strongly to people than to things”) and
decide the extent to which each statement applies to them, re-
sponding on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (definitely
agree) to 4 (definitely disagree). Scores range from 0 to 50, with
higher scores indicating more ASD traits. The mean AQ score for
Experiment 1 participants was 15.49 (SD  6.28; range  3–34).
All participants gave informed consent and received course
credit in partial fulfillment of their degree, for taking part in the
study. The experiment was approved by the University of Kent
(approval code: 201715096156554671) and City, University of
London’s (approval code: PSYETH (U/L) 17/18 11) Psychology
Research Ethics Committees.
Procedure and materials. Participants completed implicit
and explicit encoding conditions of the trait memory task, always
completing the implicit condition first. The stimuli comprised 144
trait words (half of which were psychological traits, such as
“intelligent”, and half of which were physical traits, such as “tall”).
All items were rated on a 5-point scale for valence by 10 inde-
pendent adults. The mean ratings across raters were used to split
the items into six equal lists of 12 traits (50% psychological, 50%
physical), which were balanced for valence. A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) show no effect of list or trait type (or inter-
action between them) on valence, Fs  0.02, ps  .90. These
individual lists were then organized into 12 different combinations
to produce 12 different versions of the experiment, ensuring that
each list of psychological and physical words was present within
each of the six possible referent/encoding conditions (self-implicit,
other-implicit, lure-implicit, self-explicit, other-explicit, lure-
explicit). These 12 versions were used so that stimuli varied in
relation to condition across participants.
Before beginning the tasks, participants were shown a picture of
a famous person of the same gender and asked to identify them.
Correctly identifying their name selected that name as the “other
name” to be used during both the trait memory tasks. If the
participant incorrectly identified the first person, they were shown
a second famous person to identify. Females were first shown a
picture of Queen Elizabeth, followed by Theresa May. Males were
1 Toichi et al. (2002) also investigated self-reference effects in ASD but
their study was not equivalent in design to those reported in the main text
and had several significant methodological limitations (see Lind, 2010).
Crucially, instead of comparing self-referential encoding to other-person-
referential encoding, the researchers compared it to phonological and
semantic encoding. Hence their results (a reduced self-reference effect in
ASD) may be explained by the type of social processing (evaluating
whether a personality trait applies to a person vs. judging the phonological
properties or meaning of a trait word) required during the encoding phase
or something specific to the self.
2 Data reported in the papers by Henderson et al. and Burrows et al. were
overlapping. Burrows et al. reported their sample size as comprising 79
participants with ASD and 73 comparison participants. However, 31 of the
participants in each group had been included in the study by Henderson et
al., so the results of each study were not independent. Heather Henderson
kindly provided us with the data from only those participants who took part
in the study by Burrows et al., which allowed us to calculate an average
weighted effect size for the between-group difference in the size of self-
bias in each study independently.
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shown a picture of Prince Charles, followed by David Cameron.
For each participant, the experimenter checked that the first name
on the consent form was their preferred name. If it was not, the
verbally stated preferred name was used. Participants were in-
formed that throughout the experiment they would be seeing either
their own name or the name of the correctly identified famous
person, along with some other words and would have some simple
responses to make in relation to the stimuli.
Implicit task.
Encoding phase. Each trial began with a name (participant’s
or celebrity’s) presented centrally on a computer monitor for
500ms, followed by the presentation of a trait word either to the
left or right of the name for 1500ms, with the name remaining on
screen throughout. The words then disappeared, and the participant
was asked to press the “Z” or “M” key to indicate whether the trait
word had appeared to the left or right, respectively, of the central
name. Participants were instructed that they did not need to pay
attention to either the name or the meaning of the trait word on
each trial. Rather, their task was merely to concentrate on the
spatial location of the trait word on each trial. Each participant
performed 48 trials (fixed pseudorandomized order), 24 with their
own name and 24 with the name of the celebrity.
Recognition test phase. Following completion of the encod-
ing/study phase, participants completed the surprise recognition
test phase. On each trial, participants were presented with a trait
word along with the question, “Did you see this word during the
study phase?” and a “yes” box and a “no” box. Participants had
unlimited time to click in either response box to indicate whether
or not they recognized the word from the study phase. Each
participant performed 72 trials (fixed pseudorandomized order), 48
of which included a previously studied/old trait presented during
the study phase and 24 of which included a previously unseen
lure/new item. The fixed pseudorandomized order ensured that no
more than 3 items from any category (self, other, lure) appeared in
a row.
Explicit task.
Encoding phase. Each trial began with a name (participant’s
or celebrity’s) presented centrally for 500 ms, followed by the
presentation of a trait word directly below the name for 1,500 ms.
The words then disappeared, and the participants were instructed
to press the “Z” key if the trait word was applicable to the named
person (themselves/celebrity) or the “M” key if it did not apply.
Participants were reminded that the task was not a personality
test and no-one would be judging their responses so they should
respond as honestly as possible and make their best guess if they
were unsure whether a trait word applied or not. Each participant
performed 48 trials (fixed pseudorandomized order), 24 with their
own name, and 24 with the name of the identified famous person.
Recognition test phase. The procedure for the recognition test
phase in the explicit condition was identical to the procedure used
in the implicit condition.
Variables and scoring. d= (d-prime) scores were calculated as
a standard measure of recognition memory accuracy, using the
formula, d=  z(HR) – z(FAR). Here, HR refers to hit rate (pro-
portion of old item correctly identified as old); FA refers to false
alarm rate (proportion of new items incorrectly identified as old);
and z refers to z transformation. Higher d= scores indicate greater
discrimination between “old” and “new” items, and hence greater
recognition memory accuracy. As a measure of the size of the
self-reference effect, self-bias scores (self-other difference scores)
were calculated by subtracting average other/celebrity trial d=
scores from average self trial d= scores.
Data analysis. An increasingly used supplement to null hy-
pothesis significance testing in general is to calculate a Bayes
factor for each key analysis. Bayesian analyses provide an estima-
tion of the relative strength of a finding for one hypothesis over
another (i.e., the alternative hypothesis over the null, or vice
versa), which allows a more graded interpretation of the data than
is possible using p values or effect sizes alone (e.g., Dienes, 2014;
Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). According to
Jeffreys’ (1961) criteria, Bayes factors (BF10)  3 provide firm
evidence for the alternative hypothesis (with values 10, 30,
and 100 providing strong, very strong, and decisive evidence,
respectively) and values under 1 provide evidence for the null
(with values 0.33 providing firm evidence). BF10 values can be
considered to reflect the likelihood that the alternative hypothesis
is more likely to be true than the null hypothesis. Hence, a BF10 of
3 suggests the alternative hypothesis is three times more likely to
be true than the null hypothesis. Bayesian analyses were conducted
using JASP 0.8.1 (JASP Team, 2016).
Results
Analyses of variance. In the implicit condition, the mean d=
was 1.49 (SD  0.76) on self-referential trials and 1.31 (SD 
0.64) on other-referential trials (hit rates and false alarm rates are
presented in Supplementary Table S1 in the online supplemental
materials). In the explicit condition, the mean d= score was 2.56
(SD  0.84) on self-referential trials and 2.13 (SD  0.80) on
other-referential trials. A 2 (condition: implicit/explicit)  2 (ref-
erent: self/other) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on
this data. The main effects of referent, F(1, 256)  178.62, p 
.001, p2 .41, and condition, F(1, 256)  265.55, p  .001, p2
.51, were significant, as was the interaction between them, F(1,
256)  28.71, p  .001, p2  .10.
Breaking down the interaction effect, planned contrasts indi-
cated a significant self-reference effect (self d= significantly
greater than other d=) in both the explicit condition, t(256) 
11.78, p  .001, d  0.74, BF10  100, and implicit condition,
t(256)  6.40, p  .001, d  0.40, BF10  100. However, as
shown in Figure 1, self-bias score was significantly larger in the
explicit condition (M  0.43, SD  .59; range  1.49–2.88)
than in the implicit condition (M  0.18, SD  0.45;
range  1.73–1.63), t(256)  5.36, p  .001, d  0.33, BF10 
100.3
Association analyses. Kendall’s tau correlations were carried
out to explore the relationships among AQ scores, implicit self-
bias scores (self d= minus other d=) and explicit self-bias scores.
The correlation matrix is reported in Table 1 and accompanying
scatterplots can be found in Supplementary Figure S1 in the online
supplemental materials. All correlations were small and not statis-
3 Post hoc analyses showed the difference between men and women in
implicit, t(255)  0.54, p  .592, d  0.08, and explicit, t(255)  0.36,
p  .720, d  0.05, self-bias scores were negligible and nonsignificant.
Moreover, the difference between men and women in the size of the
correlation between AQ and implicit self-bias score, z  0.31, p  .757,
and AQ and explicit self-bias, z  0.50, p  .617, was not significant.
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tically significant, with Bayes factors indicating firm support for
the null hypothesis.
Discussion
As expected, NT individuals showed a typical self-reference
effect (self-bias) in memory, recognizing trait words processed in
relation to self significantly more reliably than trait words pro-
cessed in relation to others in both the implicit and explicit con-
ditions of the trait memory task. In keeping with our a priori
prediction, AQ score was not significantly associated with the size
of the self-bias in the implicit condition. Contrary to our predic-
tion, however, AQ score was not significantly associated with the
size of the self-bias in the explicit condition either. There was
sufficient statistical power to detect even small associations if they
existed, and Bayesian analyses consistently suggested that the data
provided firm support for the null hypotheses in association anal-
yses. Of course, the majority of the sample was female and the
participants tested had a relatively narrow age range. A sample
more representative of the general population would have been
advantageous and increased confidence in the generalizability of
results. However, post hoc analyses (see Footnote 3) showed that
sex/gender did not influence the size of the self-bias or size of the
correlation with AQ in Experiment 1 and so it is not clear that a
sample with a higher proportion of males would have changed the
results.
The current results are out of keeping with those of Henderson
et al. (2009) who observed a significant association between num-
ber of ASD traits (measured using the Autism Spectrum Screening
Questionnaire; ASSQ; Ehlers, Gillberg, & Wing, 1999) and the
size of the self-bias on an explicit trait memory paradigm that was
very similar to the explicit condition used in the current study. Of
course, Henderson et al.’s study used a case-control design and
observed a significant association between ASSQ score and size of
self-bias (after controlling for group differences in the size of the
self-bias) among their 59 participants (note that groups were
collapsed on the basis that a Group  Self-Bias interaction effect
emerged in their regression analysis, although the statistics asso-
ciated with the interaction effect were not reported).
Given that ASD features are likely to be distributed continu-
ously throughout the general population (e.g., Frazier et al., 2014),
studying individual differences in ASD traits and their relation to
psychological abilities in the NT population can make an impor-
tant contribution to our understanding of ASD itself. However,
there can still be qualitative differences in the mechanisms/pro-
cesses that underpin those traits in each population (e.g., Mandy et
al., 2012; Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005). As such, a full
understanding requires the study of diagnosed cases, as well as
traits in the NT population. Thus, even though we found no
evidence of an association between ASD traits and size of the
self-bias in individuals from the general population in Experiment
1, it does not rule out the possibility that between-groups differ-
ences in the size of the self-bias (and/or significant AQ  size of
self-bias associations) would emerge in a case-control study.
Therefore, in Experiment 2, we gave the same implicit and explicit
conditions of the trait memory task used in Experiment 1 to a
group of adults with a full diagnosis of ASD, as well as a closely
matched group of NT comparison adults. At the outset of the
study, we predicted that the size of the self-bias would be signif-
icantly smaller among ASD participants than comparison partici-
pants in the explicit condition only.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Thirty autistic adults (eight women and 22 men)
and 30 NT adults (six women and 24 men) took part in Experiment
2. The number of women and men did not differ significantly
between groups, 2(1, N  60)  0.37, p  .761, 	  .08.
Participants in the ASD group had received verified diagnoses,
according to conventional criteria (American Psychiatric Associ-
ation, 2000; World Health Organization, 1993) and 29/30 agreed
to complete the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS;
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Figure 1. Mean self-reference effects (i.e., self-bias scores: self d= minus other d=) from the implicit and
explicit conditions of Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Error bars represent standard errors. ASD  autism spectrum
disorder group; NT  neurotypical group.
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Lord et al., 2000), a detailed observational assessment of ASD
features (with sensitivity of 80.4–100.0% and specificity of
18.2–73.6%; Risi et al., 2006), which was administered by a
research-reliable assessor. All participants completed the AQ
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), which has sensitivity of .95 and
specificity of .52 (Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, Wheelwright, &
Baron-Cohen, 2005). ADOS and AQ scores were obtained as
descriptive measures to characterize the samples and for the pur-
pose of association analyses, rather than as inclusion/exclusion
criteria (given that neither are intended as stand-alone diagnostic
tools and that neither has perfect sensitivity or specificity; see
Bishop, 2011, for relevant arguments).
ADOS social
 communication scores ranged from 0 to 21. One
participant with ASD did not wish to complete the ADOS and six
scored below the social 
 communication cut-off of 7 points
(with an ASD sample of n  30 and sensitivity of 80.4–100%, we
should expect to find 0–6 false negatives), but each of these
individuals met or exceeded the recommended (Woodbury-Smith
et al., 2005) AQ cut-off of26 points (range: 32–41). Participants
with ASD scored between 18 and 47 on the AQ, with five scoring
below the AQ cut-off (with an ASD sample of n  30 and
sensitivity of 95% we should expect to find 1–2 false negatives),
but all of those individuals scored 9 points on the ADOS
(range  9–21). Hence, all participants in the ASD group had a
verified clinical diagnosis and all scored above the cut-off on
either the ADOS or the AQ. All but one NT participant scored26
on the AQ (scoring 29; with a NT sample of n 30 and specificity
of 52% we should expect to find 15–16 false negatives). Results
were identical after excluding participants with ASD who
scored 7 on the ADOS (or had missing data) or 26 on the AQ
and NT participants who scored 26 on the AQ (see Part 2 of the
online supplemental materials).
All participants also completed the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale
for Intelligence-II (Wechsler, 1999), which provides verbal, per-
formance, and full-scale IQ scores. We also included two widely
used measures of mindreading (Reading the Mind in the Eyes;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; and Animations; Abell, Happé, & Frith,
2000) as a “control” to ensure that our ASD group was reasonably
representative of the wider ASD population in showing difficulties
in this area (details of the methods are included in Part 2A of the
online supplemental materials). Participant characteristics and
group matching statistics are presented in Table 2. No participant
in either group reported current use of psychotropic medication or
illegal recreational drugs, and none reported any history of neuro-
logical or psychiatric illness other than ASD. All participants gave
informed consent and received £7.50 per hour for their time plus
travel expenses. The current study received ethical approval from
the University of Kent Psychology Research Ethics Committee
(approval code: 201715096156554671).
Procedure and materials. Participants from each group com-
pleted each condition (implicit/explicit) of the trait memory para-
digm used in Experiment 1.
Power analysis. At the outset of the study, we calculated the
average weighted effect size (d) for the between-groups (ASD/
comparison) difference in the size of the self-bias on the traditional
(explicit) trait memory paradigm across the studies by Lombardo
et al. (2007); Henderson et al. (2009), and Burrows et al. (2017).
(See Footnote 2). The resulting d value was 0.65. An a priori
Table 1
Correlation Matrix (Kendall’s Tau) Showing the Relation
Between Autism Traits, Implicit Self-Bias Memory Scores, and
Explicit Self-Bias Memory Scores in Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Variable 1 2 3
1. Autism traits
Experiment 1 (adult students) .05a .06a
NT (N  257)
Experiment 2 (adults)
ASD (n  30) .11a .21b
NT (n  30) .05a .04a
Total (N  60) .01a .12b
Experiment 3 (children/adolescents)
ASD (n  26) .06a .21b
NT (n  26) .04a .19b
Total (N  52) .05a .17b
2. Implicit self-bias score
Experiment 1 (adult students) .05a .02a
NT (N  257)
Experiment 2 (adults)
ASD (n  30) .11a .11b
NT (n  30) .05a .02a
Total (N  60) .01a .03a
Experiment 3 (children/adolescents)
ASD (n  26) .06a .08a
NT (n  26) .04a .03a
Total (N  52) .05a .01a
3. Explicit self-bias score
Experiment 1 (adult students)
NT (N  257) .06a .02a
Experiment 2 (adults)
ASD (n  30) .21b .11b
NT (n  30) .04a .02a
Total (N  60) .12b .03a
Experiment 3 (children/adolescents)
ASD (n  26) .21b .08a
NT (n  26) .19b .03a
Total (N  52) .17b .01a
Note. NT neurotypical; ASD autism spectrum disorder; BF Bayes
factor. Autism traits were measured with the Autism-spectrum Quotient in
Experiments 1 and 2 and with the Social Responsiveness Scale in Exper-
iment 3. All ps  .05.
a BF10  .00–.33 (firm support for null hypothesis). b BF10  .34–.99
(support for the null hypothesis).
Table 2
Experiment 2 Participant Characteristics and Group
Matching Statistics
Variable
ASD (n  30) NT (n  30)
t(58) p dM (SD) M (SD)
Age (years) 34.89 (11.32) 39.31 (13.97) 1.35 .184 .35
VIQ 103.33 (12.80) 105.70 (10.08) .80 .430 .21
PIQ 102.93 (20.09) 105.60 (11.72) .63 .533 .16
AQ 32.47 (7.52) 15.97 (5.49) 9.71 .001 2.51
ADOS 10.10 (4.32) — — — —
RMIE .66 (.18) .78 (.10) 3.18 .002 .80
Animations .58 (.30) .72 (.22) 2.07 .040 .53
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; NT  neurotypical; VIQ 
verbal IQ; PIQ  performance IQ; FSIQ  full scale IQ; AQ  Autism-
spectrum Quotient (total score; cut-off 32); ADOS Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule (social 
 communication score; cut-off  7);
RMIE  Reading the Mind in the Eyes (proportion accuracy).
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power calculation using GPower3 (Faul et al., 2009) revealed that
to detect a between-groups difference of this magnitude on 80% of
occasions, 60 participants (30 per group) were required. Thus, the
current study was powered to detect the predicted difference if it
existed.
Results
Analyses of variance. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for
d= scores in each condition and for each variable of the implicit and
explicit tasks. A 2 (condition: implicit/explicit)  2 (referent:
self/other)  2 (group: ASD/NT) mixed ANOVA was conducted
on this data. Results are reported in Table 4 and illustrated in
Figure 1. Both main effects of referent and condition were signif-
icant, and the interaction between them was near to statistical
significance (p  .08). This nearly significant interaction was
driven by the same pattern of results as observed in Experiment 1
(significant self-reference effect in both conditions, but larger in
the explicit than implicit condition).
Crucially, none of the effects involving group even approached
significance. To be clear, there was no significant between-groups
difference in the self-bias score (self d= minus other d=) in either
the explicit condition, t(58)  0.81, p  .422, d  0.21, BF10 
0.35, or implicit condition, t(58)  0.27, p  .787, d  0.07,
BF10  0.27 (descriptive statistics for self-bias scores are pre-
sented in Table 3). The self-reference effect (difference between
self d= and other d=) in the explicit condition was significant among
both participants with ASD, t(29)  3.51, p  .002, d  0.64,
BF10  23.18, and NT participants, t(29)  2.71, p  .011, d 
0.50, BF10  4.09. Likewise, the self-reference effect in the
implicit condition was significant among both participants with
ASD, t(29)  2.03, p  .026 (one-tailed), d  0.37, BF10  1.17,
and NT participants, t(29)  2.55, p  .016, d  0.46, BF10 
2.98.
Association analyses. Kendall’s tau correlations were carried
out to explore the relationships among AQ scores, implicit self-
bias scores (self d= minus other d=) and explicit self-bias scores
within the ASD group, the NT group, and the total, combined
sample. The correlation matrix is reported in Table 1. All corre-
lations were small and not statistically significant, with Bayes
factors indicating support or firm support for the null hypothesis.
Additional correlations were carried out to explore the relation
between ADOS social
 communication score and self-bias scores
within the ASD group (only this group completed the ADOS).
Consistent with the findings above, ADOS social 
 communica-
tion score was not significantly associated with self-bias score in
either the implicit condition, r  .05, p  .710, BF10  0.26, or
explicit condition r  .13, p  .35, BF10  0.37. It is worth
noting that seven out of the eight (small and nonsignificant)
correlations we ran between AQ/ADOS and self-bias scores were
positive (i.e., in the direction reflecting more ASD traits  larger
self-bias).
Discussion
We found no evidence that the size of the self-bias on either the
traditional explicit trait memory paradigm or the new implicit/
incidental paradigm was diminished among adults with ASD. Both
groups showed a significant self-bias in both implicit and explicit
conditions, and the between-groups difference in the size of these
self-biases was small and nonsignificant in each case. Bayesian
analyses consistently suggested that the data supported the null
hypothesis with respect to group differences on the task. Further-
more, the number of ASD traits (measured with AQ or ADOS) was
not significantly associated with the size of the self-bias in either
the implicit or explicit condition among either ASD or NT partic-
ipants.
At the outset of the study, we had predicted that the size of the
self-bias in the explicit condition would be significantly dimin-
ished in participants with ASD. Our prediction was based on our
initial reading of the literature, but the unexpected null findings
from the current study (and from Experiment 1) led us to reengage
with the relevant literature to consider possible causes of the
discrepancy between results from our study and results from
previous studies. Upon rereading the relevant papers, two things
stood out to us, namely the age of samples and the closeness of
group matching across studies.
With regard to the issue of age, it was notable that Lombardo et
al. (2007) assessed the size of the self-bias on a traditional explicit
trait memory paradigm among adults with ASD, whereas Hender-
son et al. and Burrows et al. explored this in children/adolescents
with ASD. Whereas Henderson et al. and Burrows et al. reported
that the size of the self-bias was significantly diminished in their
participants with ASD, the group differences in Lombardo et al.
were actually nonsignificant. In Lombardo et al.’s study, both ASD
(n  30) and comparison (n  30) participants showed a signif-
Table 3
Experiment 2 Descriptive Statistics for d= (Recognition Memory Accuracy) Measures in Each
Condition Among ASD and Neurotypical Participants
Condition and measure
ASD (n  30) NT (n  30) Total (N  60)
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
Implicit
Self d= 1.32 (.64) .16–2.88 1.17 (.73) .21–2.85 1.25 (.69) .21–2.88
Other d= 1.15 (.68) .00–2.70 .97 (.68) .29–2.14 1.07 (.68) .29–2.70
Self-bias .17 (.45) 1.06–1.49 .20 (.42) .78–1.41 .18 (.43) 1.06–1.49
Explicit
Self d= 2.33 (.70) .92–3.46 2.32 (.74) .97–3.77 2.32 (.71) .92–3.77
Other d= 1.91 (.76) .32–3.42 2.03 (.66) 1.11–3.46 1.97 (.66) .32–3.46
Self-bias .42 (.65) 1.18–1.41 .29 (.58) .76–1.30 .35 (.61) 1.18–1.41
Note. Self bias  self d= minus other d=. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; NT  neurotypical.
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icant self-bias both when the other person referent was a friend and
(as in the current study) when the other person was a familiar
famous person. The between-groups difference in the size of the
self-bias found by Lombardo et al. was small and nonsignificant in
both the friend contrast (p  .95, d  0.02) and famous other
contrast (although this latter difference approached significance;
p  .07. d  0.49). In contrast, the between-groups difference in
the size of the self-bias was moderate-to-large and significant in
both Henderson et al., (d 0.66) and Burrows et al. (d 0.75; see
Footnote 2). One possibility that might explain contradictory find-
ings in the literature is that the influence of self-reference (explicit
and/or implicit) on memory is diminished in children with ASD,
but not in adults with ASD. As Williams and Bowler (2014) noted,
“we should never forget that the clinical picture we see among
individuals with a diagnosis of ASD represents a particular point in
an atypical developmental trajectory, in which both the clinical
features and any putative underlying factors may be in a process of
change” (p. 5).
It may be that early disruption of the link between self and
memory resolves, or is compensated for, by the time autistic
individuals reach adulthood. Therefore, in Experiment 3, we gave
the implicit and explicit conditions of the trait memory task to a
group of children/adolescents with a full diagnosis of ASD, as well
as a closely matched group of NT comparison children/adoles-
cents. The average age of participants was very similar to (and
nonsignificantly different from) the average age of participants in
the studies by Henderson et al. and Burrows et al. so that this
“developmental hypothesis” could be tested.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Twenty-six autistic children/adolescents (7 girls
and 19 boys) and 26 neurotypical children/adolescents (8 girls and
18 boys) took part in Study 3. The number of girls and boys did not
differ significantly between groups, 2(1, N  52)  0.09, p 
.760, 	  .04. Participants in the ASD group had received verified
diagnoses, according to conventional criteria (American Psychiat-
ric Association, 2000; WHO, 1993). The parents of all completed
the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino et al., 2003),
which is a 65-item parent-report questionnaire assessing autism
traits, with sensitivity and specificity of 85% and 75%, respec-
tively (Constantino & Gruber, 2005). SRS t-scores  60 are
considered normal range; 60–75  mild-moderate range;  75 
severe range. SRS scores were obtained as descriptive measures to
characterize the samples and for the purpose of association anal-
yses, rather than as inclusion/exclusion criteria (given that the SRS
is not intended as a stand-alone diagnostic tool and does not have
perfect sensitivity or specificity; see Bishop, 2011, for relevant
arguments).
All but one participant with ASD scored over the cut-off of 60
on the SRS (with an ASD sample of n  26 and a sensitivity of
85% we should expect three to four false negatives). Scores ranged
between 55 and 90. All but two NT participants scored below 60
on the SRS (range 35–90), with those two participants scoring 75
and 90 (with a NT sample of n  26 and a specificity of 75%, we
should expect six to seven false positives). Results were identical
after excluding and participants with ASD who scored 60 on the
SRS and NT participants who scored 60 on the SRS (see Part 3
of the online supplemental materials).
All participants completed the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for
Intelligence-II (Wechsler, 1999), which provides verbal, perfor-
mance, and full-scale IQ scores. We also included two widely used
measures of mindreading (child version of Reading the Mind in the
Eyes; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; and Animations; Abell et al.,
2000) as a “control” to ensure that our ASD group was reasonably
representative of the wider ASD population in showing difficulties
in this area (details of the methods are included in Part 3A of the
online supplemental materials). Participant characteristics and
group matching statistics are shown in Table 5. All participants
and their parents gave informed consent. The study received eth-
ical approval from the University of Kent Psychology Research
Ethics Committee (approval code: 201715096156554671).
Power analysis. Experiments 1 and 2 were planned at the
outset of the research program. Experiment 3 was conducted only
after results from Experiments 1 and 2 were contrary to expecta-
tions and after we had rereviewed the relevant literature. At that
stage, we calculated the average weighted effect size (Cohen’s d)
for the between-groups (ASD/comparison) difference in the size of
the self-bias only in the studies of children with ASD by Hender-
son et al. (2009) and Burrows et al. (2017). The resulting d value
was 0.72. An a priori power calculation using GPower3 (Faul et
al., 2009) revealed that to detect a between-groups difference of
this magnitude on 80% of occasions, 50 participants (25 per group)
Table 4
Analysis of Variance Results From Experiment 2 (Dependent
Variable  d= Score)
Variable F(58) p p2 Direction of effect
Condition 94.41 <.001 .62 Explicit  implicit
Referent 28.76 <.001 .33 Self  other
Group .20 .658 .003 —
Condition  Referent 3.22 .078 .05 —
Condition  Group 1.21 .275 .02 —
Referent  Group .24 .623 .004 —
Condition  Group 
Referent .70 .407 .01 —
Note. The bold type indicates statistically significant effects.
Table 5
Experiment 3 Participant Characteristics and Group
Matching Statistics
Variable
ASD (n  26) NT (n  26)
t(50) p dM (SD) M (SD)
Age (years) 12.64 (1.52) 13.28 (1.62) 1.48 .146 .41
VIQ 105.23 (10.18) 110.23 (11.83) 1.63 .109 .45
PIQ 108.23 (13.26) 114.12 13.92 .125 .43
SRS T-score 83.85 (9.67) 47.00 (11.74) 12.35 .001 3.43
RMIE .69 (.08) .73 (.09) 1.53 .133 .43
Animations .45 (.25) .69 (.18) 4.13 .001 1.15
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; NT  neurotypical; VIQ 
verbal IQ; PIQ  performance IQ; SRS  Social Responsiveness Scale
T-Score (scores  60  normal range; 60–75  mild-moderate ASD
range; 75  severe ASD range); RMIE  Reading the Mind in the Eyes
(proportion accuracy).
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were required. Thus, the current study was adequately powered to
detect the predicted difference if it existed. If working on the
assumptions we had when beginning Experiment 2 that the aver-
age weighted effect size was 0.65, rather than 0.72, then power
was .75 in Experiment 3.
Procedure and materials. Participants from each group com-
pleted the implicit and explicit conditions of the trait memory task.
Given that some of the words used in Experiments 1 and 2 might
be too advanced for some children/adolescents to comprehend, a
different set of stimuli was used. These stimuli were designed to be
equivalent (in terms of mean written word frequency, number of
syllables, and valence) to those used by Henderson et al. (2009) in
their study of the self-reference effect (using the trait memory
paradigm) among children/adolescents with ASD. One-hundred-
and-two psychological trait words (21 of which were used in
Henderson et al.’s study) were divided into six lists of 17 words,
and these lists were then combined into 6 different versions.
Within each version, each list represented a different one of the six
possible conditions (self-implicit, other-implicit, lure-implicit,
self-explicit, other-explicit, and lure-explicit). This ensured that
words lists were counterbalanced across participants in relation to
the condition they reflected. The six lists contained equal numbers
of positively and negatively valanced words and a multivariate
analysis of variance indicated that they were equated for mean
number of syllables and KF written word frequency, F(10, 156) 
.01, p  .99, p2 .01.
During the encoding phases of both the implicit and explicit
conditions, each participant undertook 34 trials (fixed pseudoran-
domized order)—17 with their own name and 17 with the name of
the identified famous person’s name. During the recognition test
phases of both the implicit and explicit conditions, each participant
performed 51 trials (34 trials from encoding phase, plus 17 previ-
ously unseen lure words). Because of the age of the participants in
Experiment 3, we replaced the famous pictures used in Experi-
ments 1 and 2 with pictures of famous people more likely to be
identified by younger people. For the female participants, we used
Emma Watson, Ariana Grande, Kim Kardashian, and Taylor
Swift. For the male participants, we used Ed Sheeran, Justin
Bieber, Dan TDM, and Pewdiepie. We used a pool of four famous
males and females in Experiment 3 given the possibility that
younger participants might not correctly identify some of the
pictures. All other procedural elements were identical to those used
in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results
Analyses of variance. Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for
d= scores in each condition and for each variable of the implicit and
explicit tasks. A 2 (condition: implicit/explicit)  2 (referent:
self/other)  2 (group: ASD/NT) mixed ANOVA was conducted
on this data. Results are reported in Table 7 and illustrated in
Figure 1. Both main effects of referent and condition were signif-
icant, and the interaction between them was near to statistical
significance (p  .09). This nearly significant interaction was of
the same magnitude as observed in both Experiments 1 and 2, and
reflected the same pattern of results (significant self-bias in both
conditions, but larger in the explicit than implicit condition).
Crucially, none of the ANOVA effects involving group even
approached significance. There was no significant between-groups
difference in self-bias score in either the explicit condition, t(50)
0.67, p  .505, d  0.19, BF10  0.34, or implicit condition,
t(50)  0.05, p  .964, d  0.01, BF10  0.28. The self-reference
effect (i.e., the difference between self d= and other d=) in the
explicit condition was significant among both participants with
ASD, t(25)  3.82, p  .001, d  0.75, BF10  42.08, and NT
participants, t(25)  2.22, p  .036, d  0.44, BF10  3.23.
However, when the size of the self-bias in the implicit condition
was analyzed in each group separately, it was nonsignificant (even
when reported one-tailed) in either participants with ASD, t(25) 
1.56, p .066, d 0.31, BF10  1.12, or NT participants, t(25)
1.12, p  .273, d  0.22, BF10  0.62.4
Association analyses. Kendall’s tau correlations were carried
out to explore the relationships among SRS scores, implicit self-
bias scores (self d= minus other d=) and explicit self-bias scores
within the ASD group, the NT group, and the total, combined
sample. The correlation matrix is reported in Table 1. All corre-
lations were small and nonsignificant, with Bayes factors indicat-
ing support or firm support for the null hypothesis. Five out of the
six (small and nonsignificant) correlations between SRS and self-
bias scores were positive (i.e., in the direction reflecting more ASD
traits  larger self-bias).
Discussion
We found no evidence that the size of the self-bias on either the
traditional explicit trait memory paradigm or the new implicit/
incidental paradigm was diminished among children with ASD.
Participants showed a self-bias in both implicit and explicit con-
ditions, and the between-groups difference in the size of these
self-biases was small and nonsignificant in each case. Bayesian
analyses consistently suggested that the data supported the null
hypothesis with respect to group differences on the task. Further-
more, the number of ASD traits reported was not significantly
associated with the size of the self-bias in either the implicit or
explicit condition among either ASD or NT participants.
General Discussion
In keeping with predictions, the size of the self-bias in the
implicit condition was not significantly associated with the number
of ASD traits manifested in any of five participant groups across
the three experiments, and there was no significant between-
groups difference in the size of the self-bias in either of the
case-control Experiments 2 or 3. These important findings are the
first of their kind, to our knowledge, and suggest that both adults
and children/adolescents with ASD implicitly process self-relevant
information in a preferential manner to at least the same extent as
4 Clearly, this lack of a significant effect was the result of a loss of
statistical power from splitting groups. The effect size associated with the
size of implicit self-bias in both groups together (d  0.26) was very
similar to that observed in participants with ASD (d  0.31) and NT (d 
0.22); the effect size was very similar in each group, as well as to the
overall effect size for the size of the implicit self-bias reported in the
ANOVA. Moreover, breaking down groups in this way is not strictly valid,
because none of the ANOVA interaction effects involving group even
approached significance or were associated with effect sizes greater than
negligible in magnitude (all ps  .65; all p2  .005). However, we broke
down results in this way for full transparency.
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NT adults and children/adolescents do. These findings fit well with
previous findings that the size of the self-bias on action memory
tasks (i.e., enactment effect; see Grainger, Williams, & Lind,
2016), as well as the size of self-bias following speeded perceptual
judgments on a shapes task (Williams et al., 2018), are undimin-
ished among people with ASD. Together, they imply that self-
experience (the “I”) influences cognition and perception in a
typical manner among people with ASD, which suggests in turn
that self-experience itself is typical in this disorder (contrary to the
suggestions of some including Powell & Jordan, 1996, and Rus-
sell, 1996). Thus, the current findings represent a highly novel
contribution to the literature. Arguably, however, other aspects of
the results are equally as important.
Contrary to predictions, however, we found no evidence that
self-reference (a) influenced memory to a lesser degree among
autistic individuals than NT individuals (Experiments 2 and 3) or
(b) was related to number of autistic traits (Experiments 1, 2 and
3) in the explicit condition of the task. It is important to note that
our previous theoretical contributions have included the assump-
tion that objective self-awareness is diminished in ASD and that
self-reference effects on tasks requiring such self-awareness are
diminished in ASD (see Grisdale, Lind, Eacott, & Williams, 2014;
Lind, 2010; Williams, 2010). We deliberately powered our studies
to detect the predicted (moderately sized) between-groups differ-
ences in the size of the explicit self-bias (Experiments 2 and 3),
and to detect the predicted (moderately sized) association between
the size of the explicit self-bias and number of self-reported ASD
traits (Experiment 1). Moreover, we used Bayesian analyses to
provide support for the null hypothesis that we predicted with
respect to the results from the implicit condition of the task (i.e.,
lack of between-groups differences in the size of the implicit
self-bias and lack of a reliable association with number of ASD
traits). The fact that Bayesian analyses consistently suggested the
diagnostic groups in each of Experiments 2 and 3 showed a
reliable explicit self-bias and were also equivalent with respect to
the size of the self-bias, strongly suggests that our a priori hy-
potheses were not supported by the data. Indeed, it is striking that
participants with ASD in both experiments had a numerically (if
not statistically significantly) larger explicit self-bias than did NT
comparison participants. Moreover, the association between num-
ber of ASD traits and size of the explicit self-bias was positive
rather than negative in every analysis (average r  .15).
How should we explain the discrepancy between the current set
of results and those results from other studies that have used the
trait memory paradigm among individuals with ASD? On reflec-
tion, our results from Experiment 2 were not out of keeping with
those from the only other study of adults with ASD to explore the
self-bias on the explicit trait memory paradigm; in fact, Lombardo
et al. (2007) did not find significant between-groups differences in
the size of the self-bias either when the other person evaluated
in the encoding condition was a friend or a famous other. There-
fore, the only two relevant studies among autistic adults (the
current study and Lombardo et al.’s) have each failed to find a
significant diminution of the self-bias on the explicit paradigm.
The results from previous studies of the explicit self-bias in chil-
dren with ASD are arguably more difficult to interpret. In Hen-
derson et al.’s study, results showed clearly that the self-bias was
diminished among children/adolescents with this disorder. Bur-
rows et al.’s (2017) data also appeared to show this, but it should
be noted that the groups in Burrows et al.’s study did not appear to
be matched for age, VIQ, PIQ, or sex ratio. Burrows et al. at-
tempted to overcome this possible confound by covarying age,
VIQ, and sex (but not PIQ) in a series of analyses of covariance
(ANCOVAs). Unfortunately, this approach does not overcome the
problem of unmatched groups and ANCOVA should not be used
when groups are not matched on the covariates (see Miller &
Chapman, 2001; also Williams, Peng, & Wallace, 2016). It is
impossible to know whether the failure to match groups in their
study contributed to the finding of between-groups differences in
Table 6
Experiment 3 Descriptive Statistics for d= (Recognition Memory Accuracy) Measures in Each
Condition Among ASD and Neurotypical Participants
Condition and measure
ASD (n  26) NT (n  26) Total (N  52)
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
Implicit
Self d= 2.03 (.68) .94–3.78 2.07 (.77) .60–3.45 2.05 (.72) .60–3.78
Other d= 1.88 (.64) .62–3.13 1.93 (.82) .00–3.08 1.91 (.73) .00–3.13
Self-bias .15 (.49) .84–1.11 .14 (.64) 1.19–1.31 .14 (.56) 1.19–1.31
Explicit
Self d= 2.72 (.74) 1.19–3.78 2.72 (.74) .50–3.78 2.71 (.74) .50–3.78
Other d= 2.31 (.58) .81–3.45 2.43 (.78) .71–3.78 2.37 (.69) .71–3.78
Self-bias .40 (.54) .96–1.35 .29 (.67) .96–1.51 .35 (.60) .96–1.51
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; NT  neurotypical. Self bias  self d= minus other d=.
Table 7
Analysis of Variance Results From Experiment 3 (Dependent
Variable  d= Score)
Variable F(50) p p2 Direction of effect
Condition 24.36 <.001 .33 Explicit  implicit
Referent 18.11 <.001 .27 Self  other
Group .16 .692 .01 —
Condition  Referent 3.07 .086 .06 —
Condition  Group .01 .946 .01 —
Referent  Group .27 .606 .01 —
Condition  Group 
Referent .21 .648 .01 —
Note. The bold type indicates statistically significant effects.
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the size of the self-bias. Either way, our aim is not to criticize the
study by Burrows et al. but merely to consider possible reasons for
the discrepancy between their results and ours.
Although the source of the discrepancy in results across studies
is not entirely clear, one take-home message might be that re-
searchers should be cautious about drawing absolute conclusions
on the basis of results from a limited pool of studies. Despite our
theoretical inclinations, it may be that explicit self-reference ef-
fects are typical and undiminished among people with ASD. The
fact that two studies from the same laboratory have observed a
diminished explicit self-bias in adolescents with ASD (Burrows et
al., 2017; Henderson et al., 2009) should not lead researchers to
view the case as closed, so-to-speak, with regard to self-reference
effects in ASD. Of course, null findings are often scrutinized
particularly heavily and it is important to rule out potential con-
founds that may have led to the null results. We have two points
to make in this regard. First, the current findings are not null, in
general; both participants with and without ASD showed signifi-
cant self-biases (the effects were present and thus not null). Rather,
the results were null specifically with respect to between-groups
differences in the size of these self-biases. Our ASD groups were
representative in scoring in the ASD range on measures of feature
severity and in showing the classic mindreading impairments that
are known to affect people with this disorder, so it is unclear how
confounds in our experiments could have artificially produced
significant self-biases. Second, it is important to note that science
(and perhaps psychology, in particular; see Fanelli, 2010) is sub-
ject a series of biases that unduly favor publication of results that
support alternative hypotheses. Through biases of selection (i.e.,
the “file drawer problem”; Rosenthal, 1979) and inflation (i.e.,
selective reporting/p-hacking; e.g., Masicampo & Lalande, 2012;
Kühberger, Fritz, & Scherndl, 2014), our understanding of psy-
chological phenomena is almost certain to be detrimentally af-
fected. Therefore, it is particularly important to publish null results
if we are to avoid biasing the field unduly. In the current study, we
expected to find between-groups differences in the size of the
explicit self-bias and powered our experiments accordingly. The
fact that we did not find such a diminution in either of two
experiments should lead to a high degree of caution when drawing
the conclusion that explicit (or implicit) self-reference effects are
diminished in people with ASD.
If the current results are valid and reliable (the degree of
consistency across the three experiments, even though the samples
differed considerably in terms variables such as gender ratio and
age, suggests they probably are), they suggest that subjective and
objective levels of self-awareness are intact in ASD, or at least
sufficiently intact to bias attention and memory in a typical man-
ner. Of course, the results do not show that all types of self-related
information are represented among people with ASD. Indeed,
there is substantial evidence for impairments in awareness of own
mental states (metacognition) and this comes from a variety of
studies using several different kinds of task (e.g., Cooper, Plaisted-
Grant, Baron-Cohen, & Simons, 2016; Grainger, Williams, &
Lind, 2014, 2016; Nicholson, Williams, Grainger, Lind, & Car-
ruthers, 2019; Williams, Bergström, & Grainger, 2016). Thus, a
difficulty with meta-representing oneself may be a specific prob-
lem with self-awareness in ASD (see Williams, 2010). Moreover,
the results of Experiments 2 and 3 may have been different if
intellectually low-functioning (IQs 70), rather than high-
functioning, adults and children had been included. Perhaps intel-
lectually low-functioning individuals have a more pervasive lim-
itation with self-awareness that would manifest as a diminished
self-bias on the type of experimental task used in the current study.
Such a result would be theoretically important and clinically
relevant, but we have no specific reason to believe this is the case
at this time. Indeed, any such study with intellectually low-
functioning individuals with ASD would need to include a care-
fully matched group of control participants with intellectual im-
pairment to show that a diminished self-bias was associated with
(or caused by) ASD specifically rather than co-occurring intellec-
tual difficulties.
It may also be fruitful to use the self-referential memory para-
digm for other purposes and to address different questions in future
research. For example, it might be interesting to include objective/
independent measures of each participant’s traits (e.g., by gather-
ing reports from a close relative or friend). These independent trait
ratings could then be compared to the trait ratings (i.e., patterns of
trait endorsement) made by the participant during the encoding
phase of the explicit trait memory paradigm. Theoretically, the
closer the correspondence between the participant’s subjective
reports of their traits and independent ratings of their traits, the
better the participant’s self-awareness/meta-awareness of their per-
sonality. Perhaps the degree of metaknowledge would predict the
size of the self-reference effect in recognition memory, at least
among NT individuals. This is pure speculation, of course, but
might indicate a new way to understand self-referential encoding
processes among NT and autistic people.
In sum, the experiments presented here cast significant doubt on
the common assumption (and one that we ourselves have held until
now) that people with ASD have diminished (or atypical) objective
self-awareness and blanket difficulties with self-referential cogni-
tion. We have a nagging suspicion that this area of research may
have fallen prey to a misleading publication bias. So, as a final
thought, we would like to encourage researchers in the field, who
may have unpublished data from experiments using robust meth-
ods showing undiminished (or, equally, enhanced or diminished)
performance by people with ASD on “self tasks” sitting in their
proverbial “file drawers”; (Rosenthal, 1979), to try to disseminate
those data. Perhaps then, we will gain a fuller understanding of
these important issues.
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